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Abstract
We extend the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model by introducing asymmetric groups of vari-
eties in terms of degree of product di¤erentiation. The introduction of these di¤erent market
segments in the demand system allows us to structurally derive more complex relations be-
tween rm productivity, size and markups, which ultimately depend on the degree of product
di¤erentiation, for both the closed and open economy settings. The theoretical results are
tested at the empirical level by comparing the performance of French wine producers in
market segments characterized by heterogeneous levels of product di¤erentiation, dened
geographically based on the "Denomination of Controlled Origin" areas.
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1 Introduction
We extend the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) theoretical model by introducing asymmetric groups of
product varieties. The asymmetry is related to the level of substitutability across varieties within
di¤erent groups. In particular, in our framework consumers still choose between a homogeneous
good and a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties, indexed by i 2 
. However, 
 is now split in
multiple subsets, each characterized by a di¤erent level of product di¤erentiation. These subsets
correspond to narrowly dened competitive segments within a single industry, e.g. standard
vs. luxury cars, to follow the example by Goldberg (1995). By introducing di¤erent segments
in the demand system, we are able to derive more complex relations between productivity,
size, markups and rms export engagement, all crucially moderated by the level of product
di¤erentiation within the segment. This helps in explaining the non-linear relations between
rm productivity, size, mark-ups and exporting behavior observed in our data, even within a
narrow 4-digit industry.
We are certainly not the rst to explore the empirical oddities of the relationship between
productivity, rms size and export status. In particular, Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) discuss
how most of the existing models of rm heterogeneity and international trade leave much of
the observed relationship between rm size and export status unexplained. To that extent, they
provide cross-country evidence of the fact that rm size is not monotonically related with export
status: there are small rms that export and large rms that only operate in the domestic
market. They explain the latter nding through a model that employs a Dixit-Stiglitz CES
demand function, augmented in order to account for product quality variation across varieties
(as in Hallak and Schott 2008). On the supply side they introduce, in addition to productivity,
another source of heterogeneity: the "caliber", dened as the ability of rms to produce quality
using fewer xed inputs.
In our setup, on the contrary, we do not explicitly model quality. Rather, we try to make
sense of the non-linear relations between rm productivity, size, mark-ups and the exporting
behavior by modelling di¤erent market segments within a linear demand system with endogenous
markups, allowing rms to choose in which (exclusive) market segment they compete1.
For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, we focus on the case in which

 is split in two separate subsets: 
l and 
h. Where 
l is assumed to be the subset of
varieties witnessing a "low" degree of product di¤erentiation, while 
h contains those varieties
characterized by a "high" degree of product di¤erentiation. We derive a number of results for
both the closed and open economy settings. First, the price elasticity of demand is lower for the
highly di¤erentiated varieties in 
h than for their counterparts in 
l, where substitutability is
higher. Second, concerning producers, the cost cut-o¤ for survival is higher in 
h than in 
l.
1The non-linearity recorded at the empirical level is not the result of the level of aggregation. Indeed, even in
the multi-product setting by Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2009), all products are treated as symmetric from a
demand perspective, and thus, to the extent that heterogeneous product di¤erentiation plays a role in the rm-level
performance measures and productivity, a non-linear relation is likely to be detected also at the product-level.
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So, some less productive rms can survive in the high-di¤erentiation sector, while they would
exit in the low-di¤erentiation one. This result is explained by the fact that, given the same cost
draw c, a rm in the high-di¤erentiation sector charges a higher price and thus obtains a higher
markup than a rm in the low-di¤erentiation sector. Unlike for prices and markups, the output
relation between two rms with the same productivity in 
l and 
h is not obvious. Indeed, we
prove that the ratio of rm output in 
l over 
h is greater than 1 for low levels of c (i.e. high
productivity), and decreases for increasing levels of the cost draw, becoming lower than 1 after
a certain threshold.
Opening up to trade has the same pro-competitive e¤ects as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008).
In particular, the minimum productivity level which is required in order to survive in the do-
mestic market grows. As long as trade liberalization is symmetric across sectors, the impact of
trade is exactly proportional for rms in 
l and 
h. Hence, all the closed-economy di¤erences
between the two sectors are conrmed in the open economy case. Moreover, one further impor-
tant di¤erence between 
l and 
h emerges in terms of exportersproductivity. In fact we have
that the cost cut-o¤ for exporting is lower in the low-di¤erentiation sector than in the high-
di¤erentiation one. This means that relatively less productive rms self-select into exporting in

h as compared to 
l, where selection is tougher. Thus, the relation between rm productiv-
ity and export engagement across sectors is crucially moderated by the sector-specic level of
product di¤erentiation.
The theoretical results are tested at the empirical level by comparing the performance of
French wine producers in market segments characterized by heterogenous levels of product dif-
ferentiation. These segments are dened geographically, based on the "Denomination of Con-
trolled Origin" areas. The analysis focuses on around 1,000 producers, observed over the time
span 1999-2008. The empirical evidence supports the testable predictions of the model. First,
producers in the high-di¤erentiation segment are found to obtain higher price-cost margins rel-
ative to rms in the low-di¤erentiation group. Second, at low levels of productivity, rms in
the high-di¤erentiation segment are bigger than rms in the low-di¤erentiation one. However,
this relation is inverted as TFP grows, after a certain threshold. Finally, exporters in the
high-di¤erentiation segment display a relatively lower productivity premium than in the low-
di¤erentiation segment, consistent with the idea of a milder selection being associated to a lower
level of substitutability across varieties.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical
model. In section 3 we discuss the three main testable predictions. The empirical analysis is
presented in section 4, while section 5 concludes.
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2 Theoretical model
2.1 Model setup: consumers
Consumers choose between an homogeneous good and a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties,
indexed by i 2 
. In particular, the set 
 is split in two separate subsets: 
l and 
h, where

l is assumed to be the subset (or market segment) of varieties characterized by a "low" degree
of product di¤erentiation, while 
h contains those varieties characterized by a "high" degree of
product di¤erentiation.
Formally, considering an economy with L consumers, each supplying one unit of labour, the
utility function of a representative consumer can be written as:
U = qo +
X
=l;h
264 Z
i2

qidi  1
2

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i2

(qi)
2di  1
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
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where  = l; h indicates the high vs. low di¤erentiation market segment, qo stands for the con-
sumption level of the homogeneous good (taken as a numeraire), qi represents the consumption
level for each variety i 2 
, with 
l \ 
h =  and 
l [ 
h = 
. Di¤erently from Melitz-
Ottaviano (2008), the parameters ,  and , all positive, are not unique, but specic to each
of the two market segments (
l and 
h).
By solving the consumer problem, and assuming a positive demand for the numeraire good
(qo > 0), we can obtain the inverse demand function of each variety in each of the two subsets

l and 
h:
pi = 
   qi   Qc 8i 2 
l;h (2)
where Qc =
Z
i2

qidi. By focusing, as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), on the subsets of consumed
varieties 
l and 
h (s.t. qi > 0), equation (2) can be inverted to retrieve the following linear
market demand system for each market segment:
qi  Lqi =
L
N  + 
  L

pi +
N 
N  + 
L

p 8i 2 
l;h (3)
where N  indicates the number of consumed varieties in 
l and 
h, with average prices equal
to p = 1
N
R
i2

pidi.
From the inverse demand function, we can derive the price condition in order for a variety
to display a positive consumption level (i.e. qi > 0). We assume, without loss of generality, that
 and  are equal across the two market-segments, while h > l > 0, i.e. a greater utility
"penalty" is attached to the uneven consumption of highly di¤erentiated varieties (
h), while
less di¤erentiated varieties (
l) can be consumed in uneven patterns with a relative smaller loss
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(h > l) in terms of utility. The latter yields:
pi 
1
N  + 
( + N p)  pmax 8i 2 
l;h (4)
From here we can express the price elasticity of demand for the two subsets of varieties as
follows:
"i =
 
pmax
pi
  1
! 1
8i 2 
l;h (5)
Hence, product varieties are allowed to be asymmetric in our model2. In order to give
an illustrative example, we may think about two di¤erent segments of the car industry, e.g.
standard vs. luxury cars. It has been shown, for instance by Goldberg (1995), that di¤erent
varieties of standard cars are closer substitutes than varieties of cars in the luxury segment. The
same argument can be extended to the di¤erentiated products of virtually all other industries
in which it can be assumed that di¤erent segments of the market vary in market structure and
density of products, thus providing a rationale for a partition of the di¤erentiated goodsset
(
) such as ours. Alternatively, one could think of di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation
as correlated (also, but not necessarily only) to a di¤erent quality of the considered products,
as an increase in the latter is known to induce a higher degree of product di¤erentiation (and
thus a lower elasticity of substitution) across products3.
In order to focus on the role of the -parameters, let us assume that the average price
and number of consumed varieties in the high-di¤erentiation sector are not smaller than in
the low-di¤erentiation one, that is Nh  N l and ph  pl, both plausible assumptions, while
h > l. Then it can be shown from eq. (4) that phmax > p
l
max, which in turn implies "
h
i <
"li. Hence we have that consumers are willing to pay a higher maximum price for varieties in
the high di¤erentiation sector, as compared to the low di¤erentiation one. Consistently, the
price elasticity of demand is lower for the highly di¤erentiated varieties in 
h than for their
counterparts in 
l, where substitutability is higher.
This result is intuitive and, as already discussed, in line with the empirical evidence.
2.2 Model setup: Firms
We maintain the same assumptions as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008). In particular, labor is the
only factor of production and is inelastically supplied in a competitive market. The production
of the homogeneous good requires one unit of labour, under constant returns to scale. Since this
numeraire good is sold in a competitive market, a unit wage is implied.
Entry in the di¤erentiated sector involves a sunk cost, which is related to product devel-
opment and start-up investments. An entrepreneur can decide whether to entry in the low-
2Clearly if h = l =  then we fall back in the original Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) symmetric specication,
where all varieties are assumed to share the same level of product di¤erentiation.
3See e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) or Goldberg (1995) for providing empirical evidence of these
arguments. Coibion et al. (2007) discuss a unifying theoretical framework for these ndings.
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di¤erentiation market segment (
l), paying a sunk cost f lE , or in the high-di¤erentiation one
(
h), at cost fhE . Having paid the sunk cost, independently on the chosen market segment,
each rm draws an inverse productivity parameter c from the same common distribution G(c),
with support [0; cM ]. Here c represents the rm-level marginal cost (in terms of units of labour)
for the production of the di¤erentiated good. There are no xed costs, so the technology is
characterized by constant returns to scale. Hence, those rms that can cover the marginal cost
start producing, while the others exit.
Competition in each of the di¤erentiated market segments is of a monopolistic nature, with
each rm in 
 facing a residual demand function as in eq. 3. As the choice of the high vs.
low di¤erentiation subset of varieties in which to produce is exclusive (a rm cannot produce in
both), we can optimize the rm decision within each market segment. In particular, optimum
price p(c) and output q(c) must satisfy the following condition:
qi(c) =
L

[pi(c)  c] 8i 2 
l;h (6)
If the prot maximing price is above the relevant pmax the rm exits. Thus the marginal rm
(indi¤erent between staying and exiting) in each market segment is characterized by a cuto¤
cost level cD such that its price is driven down to the marginal cost (p(cD) = cD = pmax), and
the demand goes to zero. We assume that both cuto¤s clD and c
h
D are lower than the upper
bound of costs cM , which implies that those rms with a cost draw between the cut-o¤ level
and cM do exit, while the others stay in the market and earn positive prots.
2.3 Equilibrium in the closed economy
Equating demand (3) and supply (6) and using the expression for the cuto¤ derived in (4) allows
us to solve for the optimal price p(c):
p(c) =
1
2

cD + c

for  = l; h (7)
and from here for the optimal rms size q(c) and markup (c) in each market segment:
q(c) =
L
2

cD   c

(8)
(c) = p(c)  c = 1
2

cD   c

(9)
Analogously, it is then possible to solve for the rm-specic revenues and prots:
r(c) =
L
4
h
(cD)
2   c2
i
(10)
(c) =
L
4
(cD   c)2 (11)
Assuming market segment-specic sunk entry costs fE , the model can then be solved for the
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closed-economy free entry equilibrium as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008).
2.4 Equilibrium in the open economy
As in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) we consider two countries: H and F , with LH and LF consumers
respectively. Consumers in the two countries share the same preferences, resulting in the same
inverse demand functions as in eq. 2. In both countries we have the same market segmentation
as before (
h and 
l) in terms of product di¤erentiation. Firms operating in one (and only one)
market segment can produce in one country and sell in the other by incurring a iceberg-type
per-unit trade cost   > 1, where  indexes the destination country (H or F ). There are no
xed-costs of exporting, and the per-unit trade cost for each country is assumed to be the same
for both goods in 
h and 
l.
For each market segment  we now have a  country-specic maximum price such that a
variety displays a positive consumption level:
pmax =
1
N  + 
( + N p) with  = H;F and  = l; h (12)
where as before N  is the total number of rms (both domestic and foreign) selling sector 


goods in country , and p is the average price of sector 

 goods sold in country  (across both
domestic and foreign producers).
Since national markets are segmented and production is characterized by constant returns
to scale, each rm in country  solves two dinstinct prot maximization problems, one for the
domestic and one for the export market, within each and the same market-segment . Solving
within each market segment, we can follow Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and derive:
qD(c) =
L

[pD(c)  c] ,  = H;F and  = l; h (13)
qX(c) =
L 

[pX(c)   c] ,  = H;F ,  6=  and  = l; h (14)
where pD(c) and q

D(c) are the domestic prot maximizing price and quantity, while p

X(c) and
qX(c) are the prot maximizing delivered price and quantity for the export market.
As only rms earning non-negative prots in a certain market (domestic vs. foreign) will
decide to sell in that market, this determines the existence of two di¤erent cost cut-o¤s for
domestic versus foreign sales in each country-market segment pair. We call cD the upper bound
cost for rms in market segment  selling in their domestic market (country ). The upper
bound cost for exporters to country  is instead cX . These cuto¤s must satisfy:
cD = sup
n
c : D (c) > 0
o
= pmax (15)
cX = sup
n
c : X (c) > 0
o
=
p max
 
(16)
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The last equation clearly shows how trade costs make it harder for exporters to break even
relative to domestic producers selling in their home market, and how, also for exporters, the
cuto¤ is in any case market segment-specic. Controlling for the market segment-specic ex-
pression of the cuto¤ in the open economy, the model can then be solved as in Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008).
Firm-level performance measures, on both the domestic and foreign market, can be written
in terms of the cost cut-o¤s:
pD (c) =
1
2

cD + c

(17)
qD (c) =
L
2

cD   c

(18)
D (c) =
L
4

cD   c
2
(19)
pX (c) =
 
2

cX + c

(20)
qX (c) =
L 
2
 

cX   c

(21)
X (c) =
L 
4
( )2

cX   c
2
(22)
3 Model implications and testable predictions
In the previous section we have shown that phmax > p
l
max (given that N
h  N l and ph  pl).
This now implies that chD > c
l
D, i.e. the cost cut-o¤ for survival is higher in 

h than in 
l. As
a result, some less productive rms (with costs ranging between clD and c
h
D) can survive in the
high-di¤erentiation market segment, while they would exit in the low-di¤erentiation one.
In particular, since chD > c
l
D, from equations (7) and (9) we have the following:
Proposition 1 Given the same cost draw c, a rm in 
h will charge a higher price and will
thus obtain a higher markup than a rm in 
l.
The latter provides an explanation for the survival of relatively less productive rms in
the high-di¤erentiation market segment as compared to the low-di¤erentation one, and is again
consistent with empirical evidence. For instance, Goldberg (1995) estimated producersmarkups
to be higher for luxury cars than for standard ones.
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However, looking at equations (8 and 11) the equilibrium levels of output and prots between
two rms with the same productivity (1=c) operating in di¤erent market segments (
l and 
h)
are not obvious. In particular, it is possible to prove the following:
Proposition 2 The ratio of rm output in 
l over 
h is > 1 for low levels of c, and decreases
for increasing levels of the cost draw, becoming < 1 after a threshold level cT .
Proof. First, by equating the optimal quantities ql(c) and qh(c) from eq. 8 we can derive
the threshold cost level cT = 
hclD lchD
h l , with c
T > 0 as long as hclD > 
lchD. If the latter
holds, it is straightforward to prove that cT < clD < c
h
D and hence that a level of the cost draw
exists, at which a rm operates in either the high or the low di¤erentiated market segment (as
the threshold is smaller than both cuto¤s) with the same optimal size. In order to study the
variation in the optimal size around the threshold, for any cost level below cT , say cT   , we
would have from eq. 8 that the optimal quantities in the two market segments are equal up to
a term L
2
. From here, since h > l, it follows that ql(c) > qh(c). Symmetrically, for any
cost level cT +  the optimal quantities would be equal up to a term L
2
( ). Therefore, since
h > l, it follows that ql(c) < qh(c).
More in general, considering a continuum of di¤erent product di¤erentiation levels , it can
be shown (from eq. 8) that the sign of @q
(c)
@ changes from negative to positive, as c grows from
zero to cD
4.
The implication of the above proposition is that highly productive rms operating in the high-
di¤erentiation segment have an optimal size smaller than rms with similar levels of productivity
operating in the low-di¤erentiation segment, and viceversa. This result is described graphically
in Figure 1. Notice that the quantity di¤erence between the two sectors (in absolute value) is
directly proportional to the distance of each rm from the threshold 1=cT and to the di¤erence
in the degrees of product di¤erentiation (h   l).
The described result has an intuitive explanation: if two rms are very productive (low c),
then the rm in the low-di¤erentiation market segment will produce a greater output with respect
to the rm operating in the high-di¤erentiation segment. In fact, the former can leverage upon
the favourable cost draw to a larger extent, thanks to the high substitutability across varieties.
Using again the example of the car sector, the optimal size of a highly e¢ cient (c < cT ) producer
of luxurycars (high-di¤erentiation) would be smaller than that of an equally e¢ cient producer
of standard cars (low-di¤erentiation). The reverse will be true if the two rms have a low
productivity (high c), for exactly the same reason: for a relatively ine¢ cient rm it will be
easier to attain a relatively higher level of output if varieties are less substitutable for each
other.
4The cost level c at which the derivative becomes positive in each market segment  = l; h has the following
expression: c = p 2
N+2(N)2
2N+2(N)2+()2
+  (
)2
2N+2(N)2+()2
. From here it is relatively straightforward to
prove that c < cD.
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Figure 1: The productivity - size relation across di¤erent market segments
Mutatis mutandis, the same conclusions are also valid for optimal revenues and prots (eq.
10 and 11) in the closed-economy setting, although the cost threshold cT in this case is lower
than for quantities5.
As the size and prots of rms change along the distribution of costs (productivity) with
di¤erent slopes in the high vs. low-di¤erentiation market segments, it is interesting to assess
how average markups, rm size and prots compare in the two segments. As the latter would
clearly depend on the assumed cost distribution, in the Appendix we follow Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008) and model the case of a Pareto distribution of productivity. We show that, under the
latter distribution, rms in 
h charge higher average prices and earn higher average mark-ups.
However, notwithstanding such higher "per-unit" performance, they are on average smaller in
terms of produced output, and thus earn on average less (total) revenues and prots.
Moving to the analysis of exporting rms, recall that we have assumed the distribution of cost
draws G(c) to be constant across countries (as in Melitz-Ottaviano, 2008) and market segments;
moreover, we have not di¤erentiated trade costs for rms in 
l and 
h. As a result, prima facie
the impact of trade appears to be completely symmetric in both market segments, as the change
in the cost cuto¤s induced by economic integration has exactly the same proportion in both 
h
and 
l.
In particular, we still have that clD < c
h
D , which implies that, for a given cost c, rms in

h charge a higher price and earn higher markups. However, in an open economy context, one
further important di¤erence between 
l and 
h emerges in terms of exportersproductivity. In
fact we have that clX < c
h
X , i.e. the cost cut-o¤ for exporting is lower in the low-di¤erentiation
sector than in the high-di¤erentiation one. Hence it is straightforward to prove the following:
5 In other words, in the case of, e.g., prots, the crossing of the h and l lines in the previous graph takes
place at a lower threshold cT ; as a result, one would have a larger share of relatively less e¢ cient rms (c > cT ) in
the high di¤erentiation market segment which are more protable than their equally e¢ cient counterparts in the
low di¤erentiation one. This follows from the fact that rms in 
h charge higher prices and earn higher markups
than their counterparts in 
l.
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Proposition 3 Self-selection into exporting in 
h requires a relatively smaller productivity pre-
mium than in 
l
Proof. From equations (15) and (16) we have that cX = c
 
D =
 . Indeed, since c lD < c
 h
D and
 > 1 is the same for both sectors, it follows that clX < c
h
X .
The latter nding extends the previous results of Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) to a di¤erentiated
demand system also in the open economy case, and conveys a very interesting message: the
relation between rm productivity and export engagement across market segments is moderated
by the segment-specic level of product di¤erentiation.
More explicitly, while it holds true that the relatively more productive rms within each
sector do export, the minimum productivity level (the productivity premium) which is required
for becoming an exporter is inversely proportional to the level of product di¤erentiation, with
the high-di¤erentiation market segment displaying a relatively lower productivity premium.
Intuitively, this result comes from the fact that rms operating in market segments characterised
by a high level of product di¤erentiation are relatively more protected from competition (they
charge higher prices and have higher markups) and thus face relatively less the product market
competition induced by the process of economic integration, which in the Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008) framework is the driving force behind the self-selection of rms into exporting.
Clearly, all these theoretical insights calling for a relation between productivity, size / prof-
itability and export activity, which crucially depends on the level of product di¤erentiation
within each market segment, open the way for interesting empirical analyses, to which we now
turn.
4 Empirical evidence
The empirical test of our theoretical predictions is conducted by analysing rm-level performance
measures of the French wine-making industry (NACE-Rev. 2, 1102). There are two main reasons
for such a choice. The most important one is the divisibility of the industry in multiple segments
dened by a specic protocol (the "Appellation dOrigine Contrôlée") which is well known to
consumers, so that each segment can be characterized by a specic set of product characteristics
and a level of product di¤erentiation. The second reason is the availability of rm-level data
including information on export activities (i.e. exports as a share of turnover) for each producer.
We rst present the French wine industry and discuss its peculiar structure. We then move
to the description of the rm-level dataset, and discuss our estimation of TFP. Finally, we focus
on the empirical tests for each of the three propositions presented in the previous section.
4.1 The French AOC market segments
The French wine-making industry has been historically characterized by a strong geographical-
based partition. Since 1935, a law decree has introduced a system of denomination of controlled
origin: the "Appellation dOrigine Contrôlée" (AOC henceforth). Within this system, a given
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AOC wine can be labelled and sold as such if and only ifthe production takes place within a
specic geographic area, which can be as narrow as one municipality. This is meant to enhance
and value the deep linkages between a certain wine and a specic territory, with its combination
of peculiar climatic and geological conditions, grape varieties as well as production techniques.
As a result, wines sharing the same denomination do share some distinctive technical charac-
teristics, and ultimately a distinctive taste: a Bordeaux is denitely di¤erent than a Bourgogne,
and both are di¤erent from a generic non-AOC table wine. Moreover, there is room for substan-
tial product di¤erentiation within each denomination, to a larger or lesser extent depending on
the specic area: within Bordeaux, for instance, a Margaux is di¤erent than a Pomerol.
Going back to our model, in case many varieties of the same wine are available, within
the same range of quality levels, consumers are expected to attach a greater utility penalty
to uneven consumption, i.e. high , in the models notation: if you are a wine consumer and
you like Bordeaux wines, for instance, normally you would like to taste di¤erent varieties over
time, rather than buying exactly the same bottle every time. On the other hand, if you drink
a non-AOC table wine, one bottle would not be much di¤erent than the other, that is: in our
model consumers attach only a lower penalty to uneven consumption across varieties, i.e. a low
.
As di¤erent AOC vs. non-AOC areas can be used in order to identify market segments
witnessing heterogeneous degrees of product di¤erentiation, the model propositions will be tested
by comparing the performance of wine producers across di¤erent AOCs and, most importantly,
with respect to a control group of wine-makers located outside of any AOC area.
The rst step in the empirical analysis has thus been that of identifying the AOC areas.
The list of AOC wine denominations and areas has been evolving over time. At the moment,
there are around 330 o¢ cial denominations. For each of them, the French Institute of Origin
and Quality (INAO) publishes the list of municipalities making up the production area. Each
municipality ("commune") is identied by a unique INSEE code6.
After downloading and merging all these lists, we have noticed that the same municipality
can appear in the list of several denominations. The most evident case is that of Vosne-Romanée,
in the Burgundy region. A small town where wines can be produced with 15 di¤erent denomi-
nations, from the standard "Bourgogne" to the exclusive "Romanée-Conti". In order to address
such situations we have aggregated di¤erent denominations in broader homogeneous groups, in
such a way that each municipality is assigned to a unique AOC broader area. This is extremely
important for identifying the market segment of each producer in the rm-level dataset, based
on the rms address.
Following this rst step, a second re-aggregation of homogeneous areas in macro AOC areas
has been performed, in line with the classical subdivision of the French wine industry. The nal
6 INSEE codes are used by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies for identifying
geographical entities. These codes allow for deeper territorial disaggregation than zipcodes. In fact, several small
municipalities often share the same zipcode. Instead, INSEE codes are always specic to a single municipality.
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outcome has been the identication of 10 macro areas: Alsace, Bordeaux, Bourgogne, Cham-
pagne, Jura-Savoie, Languedoc-Roussillon, Loire, Provence, Rhône and South-West7. From now
on we will refer to these macro-areas simply as AOC areas.
4.2 Firm-level data and TFP estimation
Firm-level data are obtained from AMADEUS. This is a commercial database produced by the
Bureau Van Dijk, containing annual balance sheet data for over 14 million companies across
all European countries, spanning the period 1999-2008. In general, for each rm, information
is available on turnover, value added, capital, number of employees, materials, labor costs and
other nancials. In the case of French rms, each company is also reporting the share of turnover
coming from exports, a feature already used in the empirical literature on trade (e.g. Konings
and Vandenbussche, 2009).
Given the choice of our sector, we focus on the NACE (Rev. 2) 4-digit industry: "1102",
named "Manufacture of wine from grape". For this industry AMADEUS reports data on 1,124
French rms. For each of them, we do have information on the municipality where they are
located. This allows us to identify all the producers being active in one of the AOC areas, as
well as the control group of companies located outside any of these areas. After dropping a
handful of clearly problematic companies (e.g. obvious mistakes in the data input process), and
those rms located in the "Cognac" area (see the previous footnote), we are left with 1,095
rms.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the rms in our sample across AOC areas. As it can
be seen, the largest group of producers is the Champagne one, with 392 rms, followed by the
Languedoc-Roussillon, with 180 companies. Also, 129 rms in our dataset are located outside
any AOC area, and will constitute the control group for the upcoming analyses.
Table 1: Firmsdistribution across AOC areas
AOC number of  firms Percent Cum.
no - AOC 129 11.78 11.78
Alsace 24 2.19 13.97
Bordeaux 49 4.47 18.45
Bourgogne 67 6.12 24.57
Champagne 392 35.8 60.37
Jura-Savoie 20 1.83 62.19
Languedoc-Roussillon 180 16.44 78.63
Loire 55 5.02 83.65
Provence 56 5.11 88.77
Rhône 94 8.58 97.35
South-West 29 2.65 100
Total 1,095 100
Since all the testable propositions in our model crucially deal with rmsproductivity, we
7A distinct "Cognac" area has also been identied. However, we have decided not to consider it, given the
particular nature of this product, which is a spirit rather than a wine. Accordingly, producers located in the
Cognac area will be dropped from the analysis. See the next section.
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start by discussing our estimates of TFP. First, we estimate total factor productivity through
OLS, by regressing value added (output minus materials) over capital and labor inputs (em-
ployment). Physical output is proxied by deated turnover. The employed deators are specic
to the 4-digit industry, and are published by the French National Statistical Institute. Materi-
alscosts are deated using input deators obtained from the EU-KLEMS database8. Finally,
capital is proxied by tangible xed assets, deated using the GDP deator.
Second, given the well known simultaneity problems of OLS estimates (see Van Beveren,
2010, for a review), we obtain TFP estimates by applying the value-added version of the
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) algorithm. The results from both estimations can be compared in
Table 2. In line with expectations, the labor coe¢ cient is signicantly reduced, from 0.69 to
0.51. We take the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates as our benchmark in the subsequent analyses.
Table 2: TFP estimation - OLS vs. Levinsohn-Petrin
Dep. Variable: ln(Value Added) OLS Lev-Pet
(1) (2)
ln(labor) 0.688*** 0.514***
(0.012) (0.023)
ln(capital) 0.332*** 0.126**
(0.009) (0.055)
N. of obs. 2894 2894
Third, as a robustness check we also estimate TFP through the Index Numbers methodology,
as applied by Aw et al. (2001). With this methodology, the e¢ ciency of each rm (in each year)
is computed relative to a hypothethical rm (in the base year). The hypothetical rm has input
revenue shares equal to the arithmetic mean of revenue shares over all observations, and log
input levels equal to the arithmetic mean of the log of the inputs over all the observations (in
the base year).
More in detail, the TFP index for a rm f in year t is dened as:
lnTFPft = (lnYft   lnYt) +
tP
s=2
(lnYs   lnYs 1) 
 

nP
i=1
1
2
(sift + sit)(lnXift   lnXit) +
tP
s=2
nP
i=1
1
2
(sis + sis 1)(lnXis   lnXis 1)

(23)
where i = 1::n indexes the employed inputs, Yft stands for the output, while Xift is the level
of each employed input. The term sift is the share of rms expenditure for input i out of total
revenues while lnYt, lnXit and sit stand for the corresponding arithmetic means over all rms
in year t.
8The EU KLEMS database is the outcome of a project nanced by the European Commission for the analysis
of productivity and growth. It has been produced by a consortium of 15 organizations across the EU, with
support from Eurostat, OECD, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre and various National Statistical
Institutes. More details are available on the EU KLEMS website: http://www.euklems.net/index.html
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In our application, the base year is 1999. Output and materials are proxied by deated
turnover and material costs (see above), while the number of employees is used as the labor
input. The revenue shares of materials and labor are computed by taking the ratio of materials
and labor costs over turnover, in nominal terms. The capital share is instead computed as a
residual, by relying on the product-exhaustion theorem.
Tables 3 and 4 report some descriptive statistics for the three di¤erent measures of pro-
ductivity, as well as their correlations. As expected, the three measures are all positively and
signicantly correlated, with some di¤erences. In particular, the correlation between Levinsohn-
Petrin and Index Numbers estimates is somewhat lower, about 0.44. This provides an interesting
room for the robustness check of our ndings.
Table 3: TFP - descriptive statistics
Variable: ln(TFP) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lev-Pet 2894 5.154 0.890 1.658 8.090
Index Numbers 2893 0.178 0.414 -1.935 2.555
OLS 2894 3.460 0.680 0.127 7.286
Table 4: TFP - correlations across di¤erent measures
Correlation Lev-Pet Index Numbers OLS
Lev-Pet 1
Index Numbers 0.44 1.00
OLS 0.76 0.75 1.00
4.3 Test of the models propositions
Our model predicts that markups rise with rm productivity with the same slope within each
market segment (eq. 9). However, such a markup/TFP linear relation is predicted to have
a di¤erent intercept in di¤erent segments. Indeed, the rst proposition of our model states
that, at any given level of productivity, rms in the high-di¤erentiation segment charge a higher
price and thus obtain a higher markup than rms in the low di¤erentiation segment. Assuming
the latter holds, then pooling together producers of di¤erent segments should result in a high
variance of markups at each level of productivity.
This is in line with the evidence reported in Figure 2, where price-cost margins are plotted
against the logarithm of TFP9. As it can be seen, price-cost margins show a great variance
for most levels of productivity. This could not be explained by the standard Melitz-Ottaviano
(2008) model. Indeed when focusing on a narrow 4-digit industry such as this, we would expect
to see a "clean" linear relation between mark-ups and TFP, with little variation in price-cost
margins at each level of productivity.
9Price-cost margins are computed as: (turnover - labor costs - material costs)/turnover.
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Figure 2: PCM/TFP relation - overall (R-squared=0.07)
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Our extended model can in principle make sense of such an unexpected pattern, as the latter
could be explained by the fact that we are pooling together di¤erent market segments. In fact,
when we restrict the previous plot to only one of our AOC areas (the Burgundy region, reported
in Figure 3 as an example) we do get a much more linear picture in the productivity/markup
relation.
Figure 3: PCM/TFP relation - "Bourgogne" producers only (R-squared=0.13)
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Table 5 reports the result of an econometric test of the latter hypothesis for all AOC vs.
non-AOC market segments. Column 1 reports the results from a simple regression of price-
cost margins over TFP (Levinsohn-Petrin) and a constant. In column 2 we add a set of AOC
dummies, keeping the non-AOC producers as the control group. As expected, the TFP coe¢ cient
is positive and stable across the two specications. In line with our model, however, the AOC
dummies are jointly di¤erent from zero, and statistically di¤erent from each other.
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Table 5: PCM/TFP relation - econometric results
Dep. Variable: Price Cost Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(TFP) 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.170*** 0.160*** 0.092*** 0.084***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.298*** 0.288*** 0.01 0.025
(0.019) (0.021) (0.003) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019)
AOC dummies no yes no yes no yes
H0: All intercepts equal to zero, F-stat 11.07 10.17 8.47
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0: All intercepts equal, F-stat 11.99 11.16 9.30
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N. of obs. 2873 2873 2879 2879 2873 2873
R-sq 0.07 0.1 0.16 0.19 0.12 0.15
Alsace -0.016 -0.028 -0.016
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Bordeaux 0.040** 0.027* 0.039**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Bourgogne -0.022 -0.031** -0.026*
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Champagne 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Jura-Savoie 0.086*** 0.038* 0.061***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Languedoc-Roussillon 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Loire 0.013 -0.008 0.01
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Provence -0.053*** -0.067*** -0.065***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Rhône -0.045*** -0.028* -0.037**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
South-West -0.004 0.009 0.009
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Lev-Pet Index Numbers OLS
Hence, as expected, producers of di¤erent AOC segments seem to be competing in di¤erent
strategic groups. When looking at the individual AOC e¤ects, we can see that most of the
signicant ones are positive, in line with Proposition 1. The only two exceptions are "Provence"
and "Rhône". The magnitudes of the e¤ects are meaningful. For instance, given the same
level of TFP, a producer of Champagne is predicted to obtain a 4% price-cost margin premium
with respect to a rm located outside of any AOC area. Such ndings are robust to employing
di¤erent measures of TFP. In particular, columns 3 and 4 report the outcome of the same
regressions when employing Index Numbers estimates of productivity. The most evident change
is an increase in the linear term, from 0.05 to around 0.1710.
In Table 6, focusing on the Levinsohn-Petrin estimates of productivity, we collapse the set of
AOC dummies into a single one, which identies all the rms located in either one of the 10 areas.
10The "wine expert" reader might be worried by the negative coe¢ cient on the "Bourgogne" dummy. Reas-
suringly, and in line with the predictions of our model, that negative coe¢ cient disappears when excluding the
producers of "Beaujolais" from the broad "Bourgogne" group.
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Having assumed that AOC areas, overall, can be seen as a high-di¤erentiation segment relative
to the low-di¤erentiation "non-AOC" one, this is the most straighforward test of Proposition 1.
The outcome is in line with our hypothesis, i.e. the overall AOC dummy e¤ect is positive and
statistically signicant.
Table 6: PCM/TFP relation - econometric results
Dep. Variable: Price Cost Margin Lev-Pet
(1)
ln(TFP) 0.051***
(0.004)
AOC Overall Dummy 0.019*
(0.011)
Constant 0.047**
(0.021)
N. of obs. 2873
R-sq 0.07
We now turn to the analysis of the size/TFP relation. Our model predicts size to be an
increasing function of TFP within each segment. However, such a function has both a di¤erent
intercept and a di¤erent slope for di¤erent market segments (eq. 8). Proposition 2 actually
states that, for low levels of productivity, rms in the high-di¤erentiation segment are bigger
than their counterparts in the low-di¤erentiation segment. This relation is inverted as the
level of productivity grows, after a certain TFP threshold. Table 7 reports the outcome of an
econometric test on the size/TFP relation, where size is proxied by deated turnover.
In column 1, size is simply regressed over TFP and a constant. In column 2, we add the
full set of AOC dummies and their interactions with TFP, thus allowing for both intercepts and
slopes to vary across di¤erent segments. The results are in line with expectations: both the
AOC dummies and their interactions are jointly di¤erent from zero, and statistically di¤erent
from each other. This holds true for each of the three measures of TFP. Looking across columns,
basically all of the intercepts are estimated to be positive, while the opposite holds true for the
interactions.
In Table 8, the set of AOC dummies has been again collapsed into a single overall dummy.
We are thus directly comparing the high-di¤erentiation AOC broad segment relative to the low-
di¤erentiation non-AOC one. The results are perfectly in line with Figure 1. For low levels of
productivity, rms tend to be bigger in the high-di¤erentiation segment (i.e. role of the positive
intercept). However, as TFP increases, size grows faster in the low-di¤erentiation segment (i.e.
role of the negative interactions). Therefore, as stated in Proposition 2, we expect the initial
size-productivity relation across segments to be inverted after a certain threshold of productivity.
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Table 7: Size/TFP relation - econometric results
Dep. Variable: ln(size)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(TFP) 1.526*** 1.657*** 0.353*** 1.100*** 0.791*** 1.043***
(0.02) (0.063) (0.074) (0.248) (0.043) (0.148)
Constant 0.132 -0.457 7.935*** 7.559*** 5.257*** 4.257***
(0.105) (0.313) (0.033) (0.101) (0.152) (0.487)
AOC dummies no yes no yes no yes
ln(TFP) * AOC dummies no yes no yes no yes
H0: All intercepts equal to zero, F-stat 24.06 13.94 9.05
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0: All intercepts equal, F-stat 26.38 13.85 9.27
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0: All interactions equal to zero, F-stat 25.67 4.57 10.56
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
H0: All interactions equal, F-stat 28.09 3.69 11.20
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N. of obs. 2894 2894 2893 2893 2894 2894
R-sq 0.67 0.71 0.01 0.08 0.1 0.18
Alsace -0.484 0.226 2.399**
(0.697) (0.195) (0.974)
Bordeaux 1.437*** 0.165 0.905
(0.489) (0.175) (0.7310)
Bourgogne -0.205 0.144 1.014
(0.470) (0.149) (0.791)
Champagne -0.308 0.693*** 0.027
(0.349) (0.116) (0.545)
Jura-Savoie 1.061 -0.968*** 1.013
(0.778) (0.239) (1.049)
Languedoc-Roussillon 4.870*** 0.181 3.169***
(0.452) (0.129) (0.610)
Loire -1.394** 0.342* 3.629***
(0.707) (0.176) (1.016)
Provence 2.089*** -0.115 2.240**
(0.791) (0.193) (0.943)
Rhône 0.739 0.591*** 2.769***
(0.607) (0.151) (0.919)
South-West 2.091** 1.379*** 5.292***
(0.876) (0.209) (1.099)
Alsace * ln(TFP) 0.134 -0.75 -0.679**
(0.141) (0.462) (0.296)
Bordeaux * ln(TFP) -0.287*** -0.535 -0.235
(0.097) (0.388) (0.219)
Bourgogne * ln(TFP) 0.059 -1.355*** -0.311
(0.095) (0.425) (0.240)
Champagne * ln(TFP) 0.016 -0.565** 0.065
(0.069) (0.271) (0.162)
Jura-Savoie * ln(TFP) -0.359** -1.208*** -0.658**
(0.166) (0.434) (0.309)
Languedoc-Roussillon * ln(TFP) -1.009*** -1.397*** -0.963***
(0.090) (0.306) (0.182)
Loire * ln(TFP) 0.283** -1.540*** -1.068***
(0.141) (0.426) (0.305)
Provence * ln(TFP) -0.448*** -1.104** -0.769***
(0.164) (0.522) (0.282)
Rhone * ln(TFP) -0.088 -1.497*** -0.693**
(0.121) (0.572) (0.282)
South-West * ln(TFP) -0.321* -2.167*** -1.265***
Lev-Pet Index Numbers OLS
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Table 8: Size/TFP relation - econometric results
Dep. Variable: ln(size) Lev-Pet
(1)
ln(TFP) 1.657***
(0.067)
AOC Overall Dummy 0.642*
(0.350)
ln(TFP) * AOC Overall Dummy -0.143**
(0.070)
Constant -0.457
(0.332)
N. of obs. 2894
R-sq 0.67
Table 9 reports a direct test of this prediction. The average size of rms has been computed
within each decile of the overall TFP distribution, both for AOC and non-AOC rms. The
ndings are clear: AOC rms are on average bigger for the lowest levels of TFP. This relation
is inverted after the fourth decile, thus providing a direct conrmation of our Proposition 2.
Table 9: Proposition 2 - direct test
Quantiles of ln(TFP)
Lev-Pet
No -AOC Within AOCs Ratio
1 290.4 341.8 0.85
2 669.7 757.5 0.88
3 1290.4 1355.3 0.95
4 1401.2 1650.6 0.85
5 2871.0 2242.8 1.28
6 3154.9 3041.8 1.04
7 4716.4 4114.2 1.15
8 7158.8 6339.8 1.13
9 13401.2 10675.4 1.26
10 141449.8 45501.5 3.11
Average firm size:
(deflated turnover, 000s eur)
In so far we have found signicant evidence on both the PCM/TFP and size/TFP relations,
across di¤erent market segments, in line with our theoretical predictions.
However, it could well be the case that the AOC dummies introduced in our empirical tests
are just capturing generic regional e¤ects, instead of any specic role of the distinct market
segments, as our model postulates. Indeed, if that would be the case, then we would expect
to nd similar patterns in the PCM/TFP and size/TFP relations also for other comparable
industries, when introducing the same set of geographical dummies.
In order to rule out this possibility, we have repeated the latter analyses for two other
French 4-digit food industries: "Production of meat and poultrymeat products" (NACE-1513)
and "Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes" (NACE-1581). The
reason for selecting these two industries is twofold. First, they arguably produce goods which are
less di¤erentiated than wine, at least on a geographic base. Second, when restricting ourselves
to the same municipalities covered by the wine-producers database, these industries display a
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signicant coverage in terms of number of rms reported by AMADEUS, and thus could be used
as a valid robustness check.
To that extent, Table 10 replicates the results of Table 6 for the two other industries, imposing
exactly the same set of AOC areas as a regional e¤ect. As it can be seen, in both cases the
coe¢ cient on the overall AOC dummy is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Thus, regarding
Proposition 1, we do not nd evidence of generic regional e¤ects working in the same way as for
the wine industry.
Table 10: PCM/TFP relation - robustness checks
NACE 1513
(meat products)
NACE 1581
(bread products)
Dep. Variable: Price Cost Margin Lev-Pet Lev-Pet
(1) (2)
ln(TFP) 0.164*** 0.169***
(0.017) (0.009)
AOC Overall Dummy -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004)
Constant -0.083** -0.029*
(0.033) (0.017)
N. of obs. 1002 5698
R-sq 0.09 0.06
Turning to Proposition 2, in Table 11 we replicate the direct test of Table 9 for the meat and
bread industries. Again, the results are much di¤erent than those obtained for the wine industry.
In particular, for the meat industry the size/productivity relation looks pretty erratic. Instead,
for the bread industry we nd that rms located outside of any AOC area are bigger than AOC
rms, on average, at all levels of productivity, i.e. there is no inversion of the relationship as for
the segmentedwine industry.
Table 11: Proposition 2, direct test - robustness checks
Quantiles of ln(TFP)
Lev-Pet
No -AOC
Within
AOCs
Ratio
Quantiles of ln(TFP)
Lev-Pet
No -AOC
Within
AOCs
Ratio
1 160.7 295.3 0.54 1 167.4 158.1 1.06
2 418.5 341.9 1.22 2 268.2 242.6 1.11
3 441.1 468.5 0.94 3 292.9 276.2 1.06
4 537.8 595.3 0.90 4 353.2 283.0 1.25
5 623.3 734.1 0.85 5 359.3 307.4 1.17
6 873.7 516.8 1.69 6 396.0 320.7 1.23
7 777.1 435.6 1.78 7 470.1 340.9 1.38
8 702.0 534.2 1.31 8 513.1 328.0 1.56
9 918.3 629.4 1.46 9 487.9 373.3 1.31
10 648.1 839.1 0.77 10 584.2 408.7 1.43
Average firm size:
(deflated turnover, 000s eur)
Average firm size:
(deflated turnover, 000s eur)
NACE 1513     (meat products) NACE 1581    (bread products)
Overall, such ndings suggest that our results for the wine producers are indeed likely to
be driven by the segmentation of the industry in di¤erent - geographic based - competitive
segments, consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.
Finally, the third proposition of the model deals with the productivity of exporters. Con-
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sistent with Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) - and with any other model of international trade with
heterogeneous rms - our model predicts that the most productive rms self-select into export-
ing within each market segment. However, when introducing asymmetric product di¤erentiation,
the cut-o¤ levels of productivity inducing self-selection are heterogeneous across di¤erent market
segments.
In particular, Proposition 3 states that exporting in the high-di¤erentiation segment requires
a lower productivity advantage (over purely domestic rms) than in the low-di¤erentiation seg-
ment. Table 12 presents a direct test for this prediction. The average TFP of exporters is
compared to the average TFP across all rms within each market segment. Not surprisingly, all
the ratios are greater than one. This conrms the idea that exporters are the most productive
companies within each segment. And yet, there is quite some variation in the productivity
premia.
Table 12: Productivity premia of exporters
AOC Avg. Exporters' TFP / Avg. TFP  (AOC Specific)
no - AOC 1.08
Alsace 1.03
Bordeaux 1.01
Bourgogne 1.01
Champagne 1.06
Jura-Savoie 1.05
Languedoc-Roussillon 1.01
Loire 1.01
Provence 1.04
Rhone 1.02
South-West 1.01
AOC Overall 1.03
Consistent with Proposition 3, the highest premium (8%) is displayed by exporters in the non-
AOC / low-di¤erentiation segment. Instead, the average premium within AOC areas (weighted
for the number of rms in each area) is only 3%. Such a low gure might also be partly explained
by the exporting model of rms in the AOC areas. In fact, as explained by Crozet et al. (2009),
many of these wine producers do not export directly, but only through specialized dealers, who
manage worldwide sales with signicant scale economies. This is likely to reduce the per-unit
costs of exporting for producers, thus resulting in a milder selection of exporters, and ultimately
in lower observed productivity premia.
An exception discussed by the same Crozet et al. (2009) is constituted by the Champagne
area, where most producers are also direct exporters. Consistent with the latter feature, we
indeed nd that the TFP premium for Champagne exporters (6%) is the highest among the
AOC areas, though still lower than the one for non-AOC producers.
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5 Conclusions and further lines of research
In this paper we have provided a preliminary evidence of the richness of results that can be
obtained in terms of the relationship between rm size, markups and productivity when adding
some more structure to the demand system, by introducing in a very simple way an asymmetric
degree of product di¤erentiation.
In particular, we have been able to derive three novel and testable propositions on the
relationship between productivity and markups, productivity and size and exporting cuto¤s,
together with their empirical validation on a specic industry, the French wine industry, char-
acterized by o¢ cially dened market segments, thanks to the AOC system.
Clearly, these results have to be considered as preliminary, although their robustness opens
the way to a number of promising lines of research.
On the theoretical side, in particular, we have insofar treated the di¤erent market segments
as entirely separable in the utility function. For instance, any disutility coming from the con-
sumption of the di¤erentiated vs. the homogeneous good in one market segment is currently
independent from the same disutility coming from the other market segment. In other words,
consumers allocate separately their consumption decisions across the two market segments, with
no interactions among them. Secondly, rms decide ex-ante in which (exclusive) market segment
they compete, irrespectively of their productivity draw. Interacting consumersdecisions in the
high vs. low-di¤erentiation market segment, as well as discussing alternative ways of modelling
the choice of rmsmarket segment constitute two possible renements of the present model.
On the empirical side, we also need to nest considerations on rm size with the rm export
status, as insofar we have been able to test only for the (relative) productivity cut-o¤of exporting
rms, that is modelling their export extensive margins. However, we do not derive insofar any
implication for the relation between export status and optimal rm size in the di¤erent market
segments, i.e. the evolution of the rmsexport intensive margins. The latter relation however
features prominently in the growing literature on export and quality.
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Appendix: average performance measures across market seg-
ments
Given the result of Proposition 2, in which we have shown that the size and prots of rms
change along the distribution of costs (productivity) with di¤erent slopes in the high vs. low-
di¤erentiation market segment, it is interesting to assess how average markups, rm size and
prots compare among them.
As the latter clearly depends on the assumed distribution of the cost draw G(c), we follow
Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) and assume that the productivity draws (1=c) follow a Pareto distri-
bution with lower bound (1=cM ) and shape parameter k  1. The cumulative distribution
function for the cost draws (the inverse of productivity) can then be written as G(c) =

c
cM
k
with c 2 [0; cM ].
The distribution of cost draws for the two sets of surviving rms (in 
l and 
h) is a truncation
of G(c), with upper bound cD. Since a truncated Pareto distribution is still Pareto distributed
with the same shape parameter, we then have that:
GD(c) =
 
c
cD
!k
; c 2 [0; cD] ,  = l; h
In equilibrium, the expected rm prots (net of sunk entry costs) for a potential entrant
need to be equal to zero, for both market segments. Hence, from equation (11), we can write:
cDR
0
(c)dG(c) =
L
4
cDR
0

cD   c
2
dG(c) = f E with  = l; h (24)
Using the fact that dG(c)dc = g(c), we can write g(c) =
kck 1
ckM
, solve the RiemannStieltjes
integral in (24) and derive the following parametric expression for the cuto¤s:
cD =
"
2(k + 1)(k + 2)(cM )
kf E

L
# 1
(k+2)
with  = l; h (25)
Assuming for simplicity that f lE = f
h
E , then 
h > l implies once again chD > c
l
D
11. The
Pareto parametrization then allows us to obtain average measures of rm performance in terms
of the cost cuto¤ cD. In particular, for  = l; h we have
12:
c =
k
k + 1
cD (26)
11This result would be even stronger when assuming fhE > f
l
E , in line with the plausible idea that pre-entry
product development costs are larger for the highly di¤erentiated product varieties in 
h than for the more
standardized ones of 
l.
12The average gure for the generic performance measure z has been obtained as follows: z =
[
c

DR
0
z(c)dG(c)]=G(cD), starting from the rm level performance measures dened in eq. 7-11.
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p =
2k + 1
2k + 2
cD (27)
 =
1
2
1
k + 1
cD (28)
q =
L
2
1
k + 1
cD =
(k + 2)(cM )
k
(cD)
k+1
f E (29)
r =
L
2
1
k + 2
(cD)
2 =
(k + 1)(cM )
k
(cD)
k
f E (30)
 = f E
(cM )
k
(cD)
k
(31)
Equations 26-31 allow us to draw a set of important conclusions for the comparison of average
rm performance in 
l vs. 
h. Having shown that chD > c
l
D (given f
l
E = f
h
E), it follows that
rms in 
h are on average less productive (higher c), they charge higher average prices and earn
higher average mark-ups. However, notwithstanding such higher "per-unit" performance, rms
in 
h are on average smaller in terms of produced output, and thus earn on average less (total)
revenues and prots.
While the rst results on average productivity, prices and mark-ups do not add much to the
previous ndings for the general G(c) case, the second set of conclusions about average output,
revenues and prots are very interesting. In fact, Proposition 2 shows that given two rms - one
in 
l and the other in 
h - with an equal cost draw c, the relation between output, revenues and
prots for the two market segments changes according to c. In particular, for low levels of costs
(highly productive rms), we have that output, revenues and prots are higher in 
l, while the
opposite holds true for cost levels above a certain threshold. For the Pareto case, we have found
out that the rst pattern prevails on average, i.e. rms in 
h are on average smaller and earn
less revenues and prots than their counterparts in 
l.
Finally, solving the model for the equilibrium number of rms, given an equal number of
entrants in the two sectors we also have that Nh > N l. In fact, it is true that entrepreneurs
in both 
l and 
h share the same distribution of cost draws G(c). However, since chD > c
l
D,
rms in the high-di¤erentiation sector enjoy a higher chance of survival. This result is again not
specic to the Pareto case, but holds true for any parametrization of G(c).
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